The paper comparatively studies non-cooperative mechanism and cooperative mechanism and attempts to search for the one having advantage in reducing rent-seeking distortions as well as stimulating economic growth. We propose a notion of cooperative capitalism, which combines the cooperative mechanism with competitive market mechanism. It is shown that it leads to faster growth than non-cooperative mechanism and simultaneously satisfies individual rationality, group rationality, Pareto efficiency and sub-game consistency. Moreover, the growing-economy's microfoundation is constructed based on search intensity, bilateral matching and market composition in the competitive capital market.
Introduction
The goal of this paper is to comparatively study two mechanisms, non-cooperative mechanism and cooperative mechanism, from the perspective of growth performance. In particular, we attempt to identify the one having advantage in reducing political-economy distortions induced by rentseeking activities of self-interested politicians.
Why is this issue important? As demonstrated by historical facts and theoretical arguments (see, among others, Murphy et al., 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001 ; and Aidt, 2003) , rent-seeking activities are quite costly to economic growth. It is therefore economically meaningful to search for some mechanisms to reduce such distortions. While noting that capitalism has been playing a dominant role in improving economic performance throughout the world, we are motivated to fix the flaws instead of either simply taking them for granted or seeking substitutions.
To achieve our goal, we construct a framework with endogenous economic growth, in which economic agents pursue utility maximization and are divided into three groups: self-interested politicians who have power to levy taxes on capital income, capitalists who own capital, and entrepreneurs who own technology. The number of capitalists and entrepreneurs evolves following a geometric Brownian motion, and matching between capital and technology through market search is the major engine of economic growth. That is, the microfoundation of economic growth is based on three margins: searching, matching and market composition.
We first show that efficient capital-income tax rate should be zero when the politician is benevolent. However, it just represents an ideal case because rent-seeking politicians always exist, i.e., politician's preference may diverge from those of his constituents to pursue his own self-interest (e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Barro, 1973; North and Thomas, 1973; Olson, 1982; Ferejohn, 1986; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Dixit, 2004) . Here, politicians are specified as game players rather than game designers.
We then comparatively analyze economic growth under non-cooperative mechanism and cooperative mechanism that can be regarded as two different types of institutional arrangement (e.g., North, 1990; Hurwicz, 1996; Williamson, 2000; Amable, 2003) . The result reveals that cooperative mechanism reduces more rent-seeking distortions, and it provides more investment, thereby leading to faster economic growth. As a policy implication, one should focus on cooperative economic growth rather than noncooperative economic growth.
In addition, for stimulating economic growth, our result implies that there should be a complementary rather than substitutive relationship between competitive market mechanism and the cooperative mechanism. As such, cooperative capitalism defines a dominant combination of cooperative mechanism, which emphasizes complementarity between politicians and capitalists by promoting encompassing interests 1 (see, Olson, 2000) , and noncooperative mechanism, which emphasizes substituability involving entrepreneurs and capitalists. Since cooperation arises from rational economic agents without appealing to third-party enforcement, cooperative capitalism is incentive compatible so that it is essentially different from central planning.
Our work is related to the existing literature in several respects. Since we focus on the basic idea that different institutional arrangements produce different incentive structures among economic agents, induce different levels of investment, and hence yield different speeds of economic growth, we are in line with North (1990 North ( , 1991 North ( , 1994 who argue that institutions are the underlying determinants of economic performance. 2 Nevertheless, we adopt a different approach. We use a stochastic differential game to identify microeconomic details that support an institutional arrangement named as cooperative capitalism, based on which much faster speed of economic growth can be achieved and sustained. Huang (2008) argues that there is no China puzzle and successes of the Chinese economy are indeed a comprehensive function of conventional sources of modern capitalism. 3 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) demonstrate that institutional differences can mostly explain why some nations fail and some other nations rise, during which they also emphasize the priority of modern capitalism.
This investigation is also inspired by the literature to improve capitalism. However, different 1 The reality is imperfect, and the following dilemma is almost robust in all societies. Social stability cannot be achieved without sufficiently centralized political power. However, political-economy distortions always exist if the political power is not reasonably constrained. Then, we are involved in the famous quote by Juvenal "who will guard the guardians?" This kind of dilemma might even explain the persistence of inefficient institutions. Our theory argues that it seems to be better to follow those paths promoting encompassing interests between the power and citizens. 2 Recently, this viewpoint has been empirically and theoretically proved by Acemoglu et al. (2005a Acemoglu et al. ( , 2005b ) and Acemoglu (2008) . 3 Due to the following stylized facts, cooperative capitalism offers insights in developing Chinese entrepreneurial capitalism. First, there are huge rent-seeking distortions that will threaten the sustainability of rapid economic growth, which in turn will threaten social and political stability emphasized by the Communist Party of China (CPC). Second, unequal economic competition between state-owned enterprises and entrepreneurs is a serious issue, which indeed hurts market efficiency as well as potential economic growth. Third, though the political power is sufficiently centralized, cooperative capitalism is acceptable regarding long-run legitimacy of CPC to the people. from the perspective unfolded by Baumol et al. (2007) , we stress the role of economic incentives underlying strategic interactions among economic agents. It helps us understand cooperative capitalism as good capitalism because it develops a complementarity linking cooperative mechanism and noncooperative mechanism as two sides of one coin, and hence induces a crucial institutionalfunction to correct government failures such as rent-seeking behaviors.
Murphy et al. (1993) indicate that rent-seeking activities exhibit increasing returns and hurt innovative activities more than everyday production, thereby becoming so costly to economic growth. As a necessary complement, we prove that rent-seeking activities hurt economic growth through negatively distorting the savings motive of capitalists. 4 Indeed, the present investigation is in line with the claim that the presence of government corruption is an evidence that most politicians are intervening to further their career or wealth rather than correct market failures (cf., Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) . Consequently, government intervention involves a certain fraction of rent-seeking activities because politicians or bureaucrats are self-interested instead of benevolent (see, Banerjee, 1997; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000) .
Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2008a Acemoglu et al. ( , 2008b Acemoglu et al. ( , 2010 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2011a and Yared (2010) analyze distortions induced by self-interested politicians who have the power to allocate some of the tax revenue to themselves as rents. The current model departs from these studies by employing a specific form of rent-seeking consumption such that politicians have economic incentives to discipline themselves.
In particular, we focus on linear taxation, whereas Acemoglu et al. (2008a Acemoglu et al. ( , 2008b Acemoglu et al. ( , 2010 ) study Mirrlees taxation. In addition, we focus on cooperative mechanism based on cooperative stochastic differential game equilibria rather than sustainable mechanisms supported by perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria.
Moreover, we resolve the dynamic commitment issue by proving sub-game consistency while Acemoglu et al. (2008a Acemoglu et al. ( , 2008b Acemoglu et al. ( , 2010 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2011a Acemoglu et al. ( , 2011b deal with this by confirming sustainability.
Also, we adopt an approach of continuous-time infinitely repeated game with aggregate shocks while Acemoglu et al. (2008a Acemoglu et al. ( , 2008b Acemoglu et al. ( , 2010 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2011a Acemoglu et al. ( , 2011b ) use a discrete-time repeated game with asymmetric information. As such, they solve their dynamic programming problem by using revelation principle while we rely on the general algorithm pioneered by Yeung and Petrosyan (2006) .
As a remarkable point, while Acemoglu et al. (2010 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2011b ) and Yared (2010) derive conditions under which political-economy distortions disappear in the long run, distortions do persist 4 It, in the long run, will hurt the development of the spirit of capitalism emphasized by Max Weber.
under the cooperative mechanism. Typically, Acemoglu et al. (2008b) prove that it may be beneficial for the society to tolerate political-economy distortions in exchange for the improvement in risk sharing, whereas cooperative capitalism tolerates certain level of distortion for the sake of increasing encompassing interests (cf., Olson, 2000) between politicians and capitalists.
When discussing the issue of capitalism by using differential games, some existing studies are to be noticed. For example, Lancaster (1973) and Kaitala and Pohjola (1990) adopt a two-player deterministic differential game to prove that cooperation between government and firm will be more beneficial compared to the noncooperation between government and firm, resulting in dy- All in all, the current paper distinguishes itself from these studies in four aspects. Firstly, we focus on reducing political-economy distortions resulted from rent-seeking activities, which can be found in capitalism as well as socialism, instead of the fundamental institutional arrangement itself. That is, we respect the priority of modern capitalism, and our motive is to improve its growth performance. Secondly, the current model evaluates non-cooperative mechanism and cooperative mechanism from the perspective of economic growth rather than welfare loss, class conflict and income distribution. Thirdly, we construct the microfoundation of growth based on search and matching and suggest the reasonable coexistence of competitive market mechanism and cooperative mechanism. Fourthly, we impose risk-averse other than risk-neutral preference on politician and capitalist. Also, to capture the distortion effect, we use linear tax rather than lump-sum tax.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the baseline model and provides some basic assumptions. Section 3 derives equilibrium growth rates and shows the associated comparative statics. Section 4 proceeds to a comparative study of the two distinct mechanisms. Section 5 explores an extension of the baseline growth model. Section 6 closes the paper with some concluding remarks, regarding the limitation and further extension of the current study.
As usual, all mathematical derivations are shown in Appendix.
2 The Model
Bilateral Matching
Consider an economy with three types of agents: politicians, capitalists, and entrepreneurs. A bilateral matching occurs as long as a capitalist meets an entrepreneur and vice versa. For each capitalist and each entrepreneur, constants u C > 0 and u E > 0 stand for their initial endowment, respectively. Let a constant σ C > 0 be the search intensity of capitalists and correspondingly
The population is divided into two groups with M (t) politicians, and N (t) capitalists and entrepreneurs at period t. Let C (t) ≡ γN (t) and E (t) ≡ (1 − γ) N (t) denote the numbers of capitalists and entrepreneurs at t, respectively. The aggregate search intensity of capitalists is then σ C C (t) = σ C γN (t) and of entrepreneurs σ E E (t) = σ E (1 − γ) N (t) with fraction 0 < γ < 1, characterizing market composition. The total number of realized matches is thus defined by a matching function
, which is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS), strictly increasing and concave.
The tightness of the market is defined by
Intuitively, when ω is very big, the market is thick for capitalists and thin for entrepreneurs. By the CRS assumption, average matching rates per search intensity for capitalists and entrepreneurs at date t are respectively given by
where
The probabilities of getting involved in a match are then respectively given by
Entrepreneurs
Now, we proceed to the production activity.
ASSUMPTION 2.1 (TECHNOLOGY) 5 Entrepreneurs are equipped with a linear production technology, namely y (t) = Ak (t) for each entrepreneur.
Meanwhile, entrepreneurs are assumed to exhibit risk neutral preferences. Then, Assumption 2.1 means that they are homogenous. By (3), the representative entrepreneur's utility-maximizing problem is
where A > 0 denotes the productivity parameter, and R (t) represents the gross capital rental rate that is competitively determined. Solving problem (4) gives rise to
Without loss of generality, to make entrepreneurs have a neutral standpoint in the cooperative capitalism, we put u E ≡ φ (σ E ) so that their equilibrium utility is zero.
Capitalists
Capitalists are specialized in capital accumulation, and the law of motion of aggregate capital accumulation is expressed aṡ
where δ > 0 denotes a given depreciation rate, and τ k (t) and s (t) stand for capital-income tax rate and savings rate, respectively.
ASSUMPTION 2.2 (UNCERTAINTY)
The number N (t) of capitalists and entrepreneurs follows a geometric Brownian motion. 5 Since the model emphasizes capital accumulation as the major engine of economic growth, AK production technology is our first choice for the sake of simplicity and tractability. In fact, one can introduce additional constraints to equivalently transfer Cobb-Douglas type production functions into AK type (e.g., Turnovsky, 2000) , and AK feature proves to work well in some empirical studies (see, Song et al., 2011, for example).
We then set:
where n, σ ∈ R 0 ≡ R \ {0} are constants, B(t) stands for a standard Brownian motion defined on the (augmented) filtered probability basis
a.s.-P , and usual conditions fulfilled. Since C (t) ≡ γN (t), applying Itô formula results in
As a result, for k(t) ≡ K(t)/C(t), combining (6) with (7) and applying Itô's rule again lead to
subject to a given initial condition
The capitalist's utility-maximizing problem is then
subject to constraint (8) . Here E t 0 is the expectation operator conditional on information set F t 0 , and 0 < ρ < 1 is the subjective discount factor. For notational simplicity, we also let
Thus, (9) can be rewritten as
subject to (8) . Also, we just need to consider a representative capitalist. 
Politicians
There is a self-interested (see Figure 1 ) other than benevolent politician in power at each period.
ASSUMPTION 2.3 (PREFERENCE) 6 The politician exhibits log preferences and has the same discount factor as capitalists.
His optimal control problem is then expressed as
subject to (8) , 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 as well as
in which Y (t) = AK(t) denotes aggregate output, and hence g(t) represents the economic growth rate. Here, 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 stands for welfare weight, which characterizes the degree politician cares about capitalist's welfare in the rent-seeking process. For instance, we can classify the governance type as: ϕ = 1, 0 < ϕ < 1, ϕ = 0 represent democratic governance, compromised governance, and oligarchic/Leviathan governance, respectively. In addition, growth weight 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 measures GDP growth's contribution to his welfare.
Indeed, it follows from (11) that the politician faces a dynamic tradeoff : on the one hand, an increase of τ k (t) implies a resulting increase of instantaneous utility (ceteris paribus); whereas, on the other hand, an increase of τ k (t) produces a negative effect on the accumulation of k(t), thereby inducing a reduction of the instantaneous utility (ceteris paribus). As such, we conjecture that there should be a critical value of 0 < τ k (t) < 1 such that his utility is maximized.
Why is it possible that self-interested politicians also care about the rate of economic growth itself? First, fast economic growth and inequality can coexist under certain institutional circumstance and during certain period. For example, in the industrialization of the Soviet Union from 6 One can employ heterogeneous discount factors as in Acemoglu et al. (2010) at the cost of more complicated computations, especially for the present cooperative stochastic differential game of capitalism. Since self-interested politicians wholly pursue utility maximization, we argue that politicians and capitalists are homogeneous economic agents along this dimension. Needless to say, we admit the limitation of our assumption, and one can relax it and generalize the present model, which is however left to future research.
the first Five-Year Plan in 1928 until the 1970s, the country was able to achieve eye-catching economic growth because it could use the absolute power of the state to reallocate resources from agriculture to industry (see, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) . Similar episode happened in the industrialization process of China, resulting in great inequality between the rural and the urban.
Therefore, inspired by these facts, self-interested politicians care about economic growth but not for improving the level of social equity and social justice.
Secondly, in autocratic societies, politicians focus on economic growth to extract more income and wealth (i.e., the grabbling hand rather than the helping hand, see, Frye and Shleifer, 1997 
An Ideal Case: Zero Distortion
Although the current study emphasizes the unavoidability of rent-seeking activities in reality, there assumed to be a benevolent government in many benchmark models. That is, in view of current underpinnings, the maximization problem facing politician should be
subject to (8) for a given savings rate. Thus, the Bellman equation can be written as
We, by using the monotonicity, claim that efficient capital-income tax rate should be zero. Moreover, applying this result to (12) produces the efficient growth rate, i.e., g (t) = As (t) − δ, for the corresponding optimal savings rate s (t).
Capital-income taxation plays a crucial role in income redistribution and adjusting investment.
In our model, any positive capital-income tax rate should result in some degree of rent-seeking distortion, reducing investment as well as slowing economic growth. In contrary, any benevolent government should set it to be zero. Actually, we will compute below to get that s (t) = 1− ρ A , and hence g (t) = A − ρ − δ, a constant relying on productivity, degree of patience and depreciation rate.
Economic Growth and Comparative Statics 3.1 Non-cooperative Growth
Under non-cooperative mechanism, the capitalist and the politician are involved in a noncooperative differential game denoted by Γ N M (t 0 , k 0 ) with given initial condition (t 0 , k 0 ). Precisely, the capitalist chooses the best savings strategy s * given the politician's best-response strategy τ * k , and simultaneously, the politician chooses the best rent-seeking strategy τ * k given the capitalist's best-response strategy s * . In addition, we let J C (k (t)) and J G (k (t)) be value functions for the capitalist and the politician, respectively.
{σ C α(
respectively, with
and
representing the current-value payoffs for the capitalist and the politician, respectively. Now we establish the first major result.
the Markovian-feedback Nash equilibrium is given by
the non-cooperative growth rate amounts to
In fact, the Markovian-feedback Nash equilibrium is a dominant-strategy equilibrium, which usually provides us with much stronger equilibrium predictions. Moreover, if we analyze the strategic interaction between capitalist and politician in a dynamic game, one can easily verify that it also defines a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) due to the dominant-strategy feature.
For the non-cooperative growth rate g * (t),
Thus, these results are easily confirmed by applying Corollary 3.1.
Under non-cooperative mechanism, only through tax rate can the microfoundation, arising from searching and matching, affect the equilibrium growth rate. Thus, to know how the microfoundation imposes impacts on the equilibrium growth rate is equivalent to analyze how the equilibrium tax rate is endogenously determined by the microfoundation. Corollary 3.1 shows that the equilibrium tax rate is a decreasing function with respect to search intensities σ C and σ E , welfare weight ϕ and growth weight θ. Also, the equilibrium tax rate is an increasing function in the market composition γ. As a result, Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2 show that market composition produces negative effect on equilibrium growth rate through positively affecting the equilibrium tax rate. Notes: The vertical axis represents non-cooperative growth rate (g * ) and the two horizontal axes stand for welfare weight (ϕ) and growth weight (θ), respectively. Clearly, non-cooperative growth rate reaches its maximum value as welfare weight and growth weight simultaneously increase towards 1. PROOF. We just mention the fact that in terms of welfare weight ϕ ∈ [0, 1] and growth weight
One can further refer to Figure 2 for an intuitive observation.
Cooperative Growth
Under cooperative mechanism, the capitalist and the politician are involved in a cooperative differential game denoted by Γ CM (t 0 , k 0 ) with given initial condition (t 0 , k 0 ). That is, they are motivated to maximize their encompassing interests. Also, we set J CM (k (t)) to be the value function.
ASSUMPTION 3.1 (ADDITIVITY) Payoffs/utilities are transferable across the capitalist and the politician, and over time.
Using (10), (11) and Assumption 3.1, the maximization problem under cooperative mechanism can be written as 
And the cooperative growth rate is
By Proposition 3.2, we can proceed to comparative-static analyses, as one can see below.
COROLLARY 3.4 For the cooperative equilibrium {s
In words, an increase in search intensities (for both capitalists and entrepreneurs) will reduce the equilibrium savings rate, although the magnitude of marginal effect is different (see Figure   3 for intuitive observations). It follows from the proof in Appendix that such a relationship lies in the fact that equilibrium savings rate negatively depends on the matching likelihood while the latter positively depends on search intensities.
Moreover, an increase in the fraction of capitalists results in an increase in the equilibrium savings rate. That is, when the market becomes thinner for capitalists, equilibrium savings rate will be increased. Indeed, it is competition pressure among capitalists that induces a higher investment to attract entrepreneurs. In addition, welfare weight and growth weight impose completely opposite impacts on the equilibrium savings rate, i.e., it is an increasing function of growth weight Comparing Corollary 3.1 with Corollary 3.4 reveals that equilibrium tax rates share the same comparative statics with respect to the microfoundation under alternative mechanisms. In particular, they are decreasing functions of search intensities, welfare weight and growth weight, although the magnitude of marginal effect is different (see Figure 4 ). Notice that, in both mechanisms, tax rate downward distorts growth rate and capitalist's utility while growth weight and welfare weight upward impact growth rate and capitalist's utility, thus increased growth and welfare weights imply weakened rent-seeking motive, which is realized via cutting the tax rate.
Interestingly, an increase in the fraction of capitalists in the market results in an increase in the equilibrium tax rate. We know that capitalist's matching probability, which positively affects his utility, is a decreasing function of this fraction. Hence, tax rate and market composition, arising respectively from government intervention and market competition, represent two kinds of inherently consistent (i.e., market competition might reinforce rent-seeking distortion) downward distortions placed on his utility. Moreover, we always have τ * * k (t) < τ * k (t) (see Figure 4 ). Accordingly, we can derive: COROLLARY 3.5 For the cooperative growth rate g * * (t),
It follows from (12) that growth rate positively relies on savings rate while negatively relying on tax rate. By Corollary 3.4, search intensities negatively affect equilibrium growth rate through savings rate on the one hand, whereas, on the other hand, they positively impact it via tax rate.
Since the former negative effect overwhelms the latter positive effect, cooperative growth rate is a decreasing function of search intensities. Similar assertion follows for the welfare weight. In addition, since the market composition positively impacts equilibrium growth rate by savings rate while negatively affecting it via tax rate, it is an increasing function of market composition as the former positive effect outweighs the latter negative effect. For the growth weight, as it positively affects equilibrium growth rate through margins of savings rate and tax rate, the comprehensive effect is immediate. 
PROOF. Compare Corollary 3.2 with Corollary 3.5 gives the required assertion.
That is, increasing search intensities of capitalists and entrepreneurs will promote noncooperative growth while retarding cooperative growth, increasing the market fraction of capitalists (or reducing the market fraction of entrepreneurs) will retard non-cooperative growth while promoting cooperative growth, and the more democratic the economic regulation, the faster speed non-cooperative growth produces while the slower speed cooperative growth exhibits.
From the standpoint of economic growth, this result documents one substantial difference between non-cooperative mechanism and cooperative mechanism. One can also refer to Figure 5 for intuitive observations. PROOF. This is a direct application of Corollary 3.5. In particular, in terms of welfare weight ϕ ∈ [0, 1] and growth weight θ ∈ [0, 1], for any t ≥ t 0 .
Here, oligarchic governance means that tax rate is chosen wholly for seeking rent. Our result hence encompasses that cooperative mechanism can support a type of institutional arrangement involving oligarchic governance (i.e., ϕ = 0) and growth-oriented policy (i.e., θ = 1) that leads to the fastest speed of economic growth. Actually, this is a formal demonstration of the following views.
First, Baumol et al. (2007) argue that state-guided capitalism is a kind of system, which is however different from central planning, such that the government can typically take a regulation position to make the economy have the best way to maximize its economic growth. Furthermore, one can refer to Figure 6 for an intuitive observation. Notes: The vertical axis represents the cooperative growth rate (g * * ), which reaches its maximum value as welfare weight decreases towards 0 and growth weight increases towards 1. 
, where g (t) is the efficient growth rate under a benevolent government.
PROOF. This is a corollary of Corollary 3.7.
In other words, cooperative mechanism (compatible with equilibrium rent-seeking distortions)
can dominate the traditional benevolent governance (with a benevolent government and hence without any equilibrium rent-seeking distortions) from the dimension of stimulating economic growth.
Non-cooperative Mechanism vs. Cooperative Mechanism
In what follows, we shall show that the proposed cooperative mechanism fulfills properties: group rationality, individual rationality, sub-game consistency and Pareto efficiency under certain cooperative equilibrium solution concept. Indeed, we will derive the payoff distribution procedure (PDP) of the cooperative differential game based upon sub-game consistent imputation and provided that the politician and the capitalist agree to act according to agreed-upon Pareto-optimal principles, say, Nash bargaining solution and Shapley value.
From Proposition 3.2, the cooperative-equilibrium trajectory of capital per capita can be expressed as
subject to the given initial condition k (t 0 ) ≡ k 0 > 0. The strong solution can be written as the integral form
Let Ξ * * t denote the set of reliable values of k * * (t) at time t generated by (14) . In particular, we employ k * * t to represent a generic element of set
, assigned respectively to the capitalist and the politician, denote the instantaneous
we put
for capitalist and/or politician abbreviated to an economic agent i ∈ {C, G}, k * * τ ∈ Ξ * * τ , k * * t ∈ Ξ * * t and t ≥ τ ≥ t 0 . Accordingly, based on an agreed-upon Pareto principle, the vec-
] for τ ≥ t 0 are valid imputations in the sense of the following definition.
] is a Pareto optimal imputation vector;
(2) Individual rationality requirement, i.e.,
and also
for i ∈ {C, G} and t ≥ τ ≥ t 0 . Noting that
for i ∈ {C, G} and k * * t ∈ Ξ * * t , we have the following definition.
DEFINITION 4.2 (SUB-GAME CONSISTENCY) A solution imputation is said to meet sub-game consistency if it satisfies condition (15).
That is, sub-game consistency requires that the extension of the solution policy to a situation with a later starting time and any feasible state brought about by prior optimal behaviors would remain optimal. 
is assigned to player i, for i ∈ {C, G}; and at time τ ∈ [t 0 , ∞), an imputation
is assigned to player i, for i ∈ {C, G}, k * * τ ∈ Ξ * * τ and
In the two-player game, Nash bargaining solution and Shapley value coincide with each other.
Although Shapley value is commonly used, equal imputation of cooperative gains may not be agreeable to some players especially when their size of noncooperative payoffs is asymmetric.
For example, non-cooperative payoffs of capitalist and politician may be significantly asymmetric in reality owing to de facto unequal social status as well as unequal opportunity. So, we also consider the following allocation principle in which players' shares of the gain from cooperation are proportional to the relative size of their expected noncooperative payoffs. 
for i ∈ {C, G}; and in the sub-game Γ CM (τ, k * * τ ) for τ ∈ [t 0 , ∞), the imputation assigned to player i is
for i ∈ {C, G} and k * * τ ∈ Ξ * * τ . Now, we have the following result. Group rationality confirms the basic legitimacy and tenability of cooperative mechanism. That is, compared to non-cooperative mechanism, it produces a much bigger cake available for allocation. Our result also argues that it induces a higher equilibrium investment, a lower equilibrium rent-seeking level, and hence a faster speed of economic growth relative to the non-cooperative mechanism. By combining Figure 2 with Figure 6 , we get Figure 7 for intuitive observation.
Even so, the following arguments are worth emphasizing to avoid any misleading interpretations.
First, although the politician is allowed to be completely self-interested from the standpoint of human nature, cooperative capitalism does not suggest a path towards authoritarianism. Instead, its sustainability relies on democratic institutional arrangements. On one hand, only when the economy is under democracy (i.e., politicians face the risk of being replaced) can we reasonably expect politicians to have sufficient incentive/motive to promote the encompassing interest. Since all economic agents are under the democratic institutional constraint, politicians are game players other than rule designers (or dictators).
On the other hand, although it is possible for some dictators to provide good rules or policies, people generally do not desire dictatorships, especially under modern political civilization, and overwhelming numbers of dictators actually lead people to very poor economic outcomes. Therefore, cooperative capitalism is consistent with (and hence can be seen as a special realization of) democracy in the sense that well-intentioned politicians will do the right things, and more importantly, not so well-intentioned politicians are restricted or at least not induced to do the wrong things in the process of stimulating economic growth.
Second, cooperative capitalism is a kind of good institutional arrangement. (1) It encourages self-interested politicians to focus more on long-run benefits of economic growth. That is, they will not be tempted to jeopardize sustainable growth for short-sighted benefits. (2) It proposes a much healthier relationship between politicians and capitalists by allowing for rational bargaining between the power and citizens. 7 7 In recent years, more and more politicians of Chinese local governments try to build up cooperation through Notes: We combine non-cooperative and cooperative growth rates into one graph for comparison, clearly cooperative growth rate is higher than non-cooperative growth rate.
Third, cooperative mechanism provides economic incentives with which politicians will not directly compete with capitalists. In China, one serious problem is that the government (represented by state-owned enterprises) directly competes with private enterprises in some economic fields, hence creating numerous rent-seeking opportunities and transferring a great amount of wealth from the people to the government (see, for instance, Coase and Wang, 2012) . This also partly explains why the Chinese government is very rich while the per capita income level is still very low.
Fourth, since we ignore labor input in the production activity, we just use capitalists to represent households, and hence cooperative capitalism should not be misunderstood as crony capitalism. In other words, we stress the crucial role capital as well as the spirit of capitalism plays in promoting economic growth.
Beyond Growth: Endogenous Sustainable Development
As is well known, sustainable development satisfies the needs of the present without sacrificing the needs of future generations. To meet this basic requirement, we additionally place an assumption, rational bargaining with related citizens to resolve the dispute of compensation for expropriated land (refer to the website https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XuRPFqhsBXQ&list=WL&index=11).
namely intergenerational altruism, on capitalists who are the capital/wealth owners. Even so, the welfare criterion should not be dictated by the long-run future, as is axiomatically suggested by Chichilinisky (1997) . In consequence, we should not ignore the importance of transition between successive generations (see Figure 8 ).
To simplify analysis and focus on the key point, suppose that the bilateral matching process has been finished. We then define the following dynamic game.
• Stage 1. To endogenize the time-length staying in market and simultaneously make sustainability be met, any given generation of capitalists faces the following optimization problem:
subject to (8) for any given savings rate and tax rate, a constant ϖ > 0 standing for the associated transaction cost and the set of admissible stopping times T ≡ {P almost surely finite F−stopping times }. That is, the present capitalist determines an optimal exit time to maximize his terminal capital stock level left for future generations.
• Stage 2. Since we comparatively study non-cooperative mechanism and cooperative mechanism, we will respectively define the problems:
-Stage 2a. Under non-cooperative mechanism, the capitalist chooses 0 < s (t) < 1 to maximize
subject to (8) , and the politician's maximizing problem reads as
-Stage 2b. Under cooperative mechanism, the maximizing problem amounts to
subject to (8) .
By using backward induction principle, we arrive at: Xiaoping's "Reform and Openning-up" policy, and gradual privatization by experimentally adopting free-market mechanism during the 1980s have fundamentally revived the Chinese economy.
As a result, China has experienced economic take-off since 1980s (see, Tian, 1996a Tian, , 1996b 
Concluding Remarks
The paper, on one hand, offers a framework with closed-form solutions to comparatively study the growth performance of alternative institutional arrangements. We construct the microfoundation based on searching and matching, against which economic growth prefers cooperative capitalism, which features a desirable combination of noncooperative (such as competitive market) mechanism and the cooperative mechanism. On the other hand, given that politicians are self-interested and rent-seeking activities are unavoidable, one can regard the study as searching for a mechanism embedding capitalism to reduce rent-seeking distortions.
The key point is to provide effective incentives for politicians to internalize the negative externality of such distortions. Fortunately, the cooperative mechanism, which simultaneously respects individual rationality, group rationality, sub-game consistency and Pareto efficiency, supports an equilibrium arrangement that performs reasonably well in this point.
However, the issue regarding institutional transition between alternative states is left unexplored. Admittedly, non-cooperative mechanism and cooperative mechanism just represent two special choices of institutional arrangement, meaning that there may be some states in between.
In consequence, there exist different paths of institutional transition, e.g., not just a simple switch from non-cooperative mechanism to cooperative mechanism, or vice versa (see, for example, Tian, 1996a Tian, , 1996b Tian, , 2000 Tian, , 2001 ).
In reality, some economies follow a path characterized by a consistent, deliberate and progressive policy framework instead of shock therapy (or the big bang) proposed by Sachs (1993) .
For example, property rights protection in China is very poor in the 1980s, but the marginal improvement is huge relative to the Cultural Revolution period. As such, directional liberalism other than massive privatization at the earlier stage of institutional transition to the market economy provides great incentives for entrepreneurship and economic growth (e.g., Tian, 1996a Tian, , 1996b Tian, , 2000 Huang, 2008) .
Based on the stylized facts arising from transition economies' experiences (e.g., Roland, 2000) , one possible extension is to build a theory comparing and evaluating alternative pathes of economic and political transitions from both short-run and long-run perspectives. 
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1: To prove this proposition, we just need to confirm the following lemmas.
, and J C (k (t)) can be explicitly derived.
, and J G (k (t)) can be explicitly derived.
e., the transversality condition is satisfied almost surely.
e., the transversality condition holds true almost surely.
PROOF. We omit it as it is quite similar to that of Lemma 6.3.
Proof of Lemma 6.1. For the first Bellman equation in Definition 3.1, the FOC is
Substituting this term into the Bellman equation produces
Based on the guess-and-verify approach, we try J C (k (t)) = C 1 + C 2 ln k (t) for some parameters C 1 and C 2 , to be determined. Then, by (17) we get
Hence, by (16) and (18) we obtain s * (t) = 1 − ρ A , as required.
Proof of Lemma 6.2. For the second Bellman equation in Definition 3.1, the FOC is
Inserting this result into the Bellman equation reveals that
If we put J G (k (t)) = C 3 + C 4 ln k (t) for some parameters C 3 and C 4 , to be determined, then using (20) produces
So, (19) combines with (21) gives rise to the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 6.3 . It follows from Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 that
By applying Itô formula,
Note that e −ρ(t−t 0 ) B (t) = 
For the function
specification, which hence implies that f (x) is a strictly increasing function of x. Note that f (0) = α (0) − α ′ (0) 0 = 0 and we just consider the case corresponding to
So, applying this result to (22) produces that
as well as
exactly as required. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
For the Bellman equation in Definition 3.2, the FOCs are
Inserting (23) and (24) into the above Bellman equation produces
If we put J CM (k (t)) = C 5 + C 6 ln k (t) for some parameters C 5 and C 6 , remaining to be determined, then plugging it in (25) can pin down
We, by making use of (23), (24) and (25), obtain the desired results. And along the derived cooperative-equilibrium path, we have lim t→∞ e −ρ(t−t 0 ) J CM (k (t)) = 0 almost surely, i.e., the transversality condition is fulfilled almost surely for (13) . Since the proof is quite similar to that of Lemma 6.3, we thus take it as omitted. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 3.4:
We first get
Also, we can show that
by our assumption imposed on α (·). Additionally, we can obtain
It is easy to conclude by applying the chain rule that
Similarly, we can obtain
Moreover, we get that
as required. By Proposition 3.2, it is trivial that ∂τ * * k (t) ∂θ < 0 and
Proof of Corollary 3.5: First, based on Proposition 3.2 we can get
Moreover, we can get
We have shown the following results in proving Corollary 3.4:
Hence, by using the chain rule of calculus, we have
Similarly, we can get Proof of Lemma 6.5. We know that J C (k (t)) = C 1 + C 2 ln k (t) with C 1 and C 2 given in the proof of Lemma 6.1, J G (k (t)) = C 3 + C 4 ln k (t) with C 3 and C 4 given in the proof of Lemma 6.2, and J CM (k (t)) = C 5 + C 6 ln k (t) with C 5 and C 6 given in the proof of Proposition 3.2.
First, it follows from (18), (21) and (26) that C 2 + C 4 = C 6 . To prove this lemma, we just need to
If we set the following numerical values
. Since ln
) < 0.93 < 1, the required assertion follows. Furthermore, we consider another numerical example as
Substituting this into the formula of Ψ gives rise to Ψ = exp (27) and (28), i.e.,
is verified under both (27) and (28), which are two reasonable cases for the present model. As is obvious, even though it is mathematically difficult to obtain C 5 > C 1 +C 3 for any given parameter combinations, there exist sufficiently many numerical examples such that C 5 > C 1 + C 3 holds true, and we leave more detailed computations and verifications to interested readers to economize on the space of paper.
Proof of Lemma 6.7 . Note that the equilibrium feedback strategies in (10), (11) and (13) 
, the non-cooperative equilibrium trajectory of capital per capita determined by Proposition 3.1 at time t, and similarly 
, the cooperative-equilibrium trajectory of capital per capita determined by (14) . Moreover, along the non-cooperative trajectory, namely {k
one can obtain
where J (t 0 )C (τ, k * τ ) measures the expected present value of the capitalist's payoff in the time interval [τ, ∞) when k * (τ ) = k * τ and the game starts from time t 0 ≤ τ . For the politician, we can similarly obtain
measures the expected present value of the politician's payoff in the time interval [τ, ∞) when k * (τ ) = k * τ and the game starts from time t 0 ≤ τ . Similarly, for the cooperative game Γ CM (t 0 , k 0 ), we can obtain
measures the expected present value of the cooperative payoff in the time interval [τ, ∞) when k * * (τ ) = k * * τ and the game starts from time t 0 ≤ τ . Now, we can establish the Nash bargaining solution/Shapley value along the cooperative-
for i ∈ {C, G}, t 0 ≤ τ < ∞ and k * * τ ∈ Ξ * * τ . Moreover, individual rationality immediately follows from the group rationality proved by Lemma 6.5 and also Definitions 4.1 and 4.3.
At date t ≥ t 0 , if no one deviates from cooperation, the payoff allocation is
the capitalist unilaterally deviates from cooperation, he gets payoff J C (k (t)
with C 1 and C 2 given in the proof of Lemma 6.1, andk(t) is a solution of
We know that J C (k * * (t)) = C 1 + C 2 ln k * * (t) with the same C 1 and C 2 except that k * * (t) is given by (14) . As it is easy to see that k * * (t) >k(t), we arrive at
. Second, if the politician unilaterally deviates from cooperation, he will get payoff
with C 3 and C 4 given in the proof of Lemma 6.2, andk(t) is a solution of
Since J G (k * * (t)) = C 3 + C 4 ln k * * (t) with the same C 3 and C 4 except that k * * (t) is given by
To sum up, unilateral deviation always results in less payoff, hence neither the capitalist nor the politician will unilaterally deviate from cooperation.
Proof of Lemma 6.8 . In fact, the proof is quite similar to that of Lemma 6.7. That is, given the Markovian property we can get the following equalities:
for t 0 ≤ τ < ∞ and k * * τ ∈ Ξ * * τ . Thus, we see that
for i ∈ {C, G}, t 0 ≤ τ < ∞ and k * * τ ∈ Ξ * * τ . Additionally, one can verify individual rationality by directly applying Lemma 6.5, Definitions 4.1 and 4.4.
Since by Lemma 6.5 the payoff allocation under cooperation satisfies
Under the non-cooperative mechanism, the Markovian-feedback Nash equilibrium
, and the value functions are given by
PROOF. We omit the proof because it is straightforward. 
PROOF. We also take it as omitted.
LEMMA 6.11 Group rationality is fully satisfied, i.e., J CM (k (t)) > J C (k (t)) + J G (k (t)) along any given trajectory {k (t)}
PROOF. Combine Lemma 6.9 with Lemma 6.10 gives rise to
which always holds true, as required.
LEMMA 6.12 The cooperative growth rate is larger than the non-cooperative growth rate.
PROOF. This is a trivial application of (12), Lemmas 6.9 and 6.10.
As a consequence, part (i) of the proposition is established. Next, we proceed to (ii) and (iii).
We first consider the case of non-cooperative mechanism. By Lemma 6.9 the optimal stopping problem reads as
To solve this problem, we divide it into several steps.
Step 1. The characteristic operator A of the process Q (t) ≡ (t 0 + t, k (t)) is given by
) .
Let ζ (t 0 , k 0 ) ≡ e −ρt 0 (k 0 − ϖ), then Aζ (t 0 , k 0 ) = e −ρt 0 [(
So, Σ ≡ {(t 0 , k 0 ) ; Aζ (t 0 , k 0 ) > 0} = { (t 0 , k 0 ) ; k 0 < ρϖ δ+n+3ρ−A−σ 2 } whenever we put δ + n + 3ρ > A + σ 2 , which hence will be taken as given in the following proof. Now, we determine the associated continuation region denoted by Π. First, note that for ∀t ′ ,
Then, we can get
which yields that the continuation region Π is invariant w.r.t. t in the sense that Π + (t ′ , 0) = Π for ∀t ′ . In consequence, the connected component of Π that contains Σ must have the form
Indeed, Π cannot have any other components and we prove this claim by means of contradiction.
Suppose that Σ ′ is another component of Π and it is disjoint from Σ. Step 2. To prove that τ * = inf {t; k (t) ≥ k * } indeed defines an optimal stopping time, we need to confirm the following claims by applying the Theorem of Variational Inequalities for
Optimal Stopping (see, Øksendal, 2003 , pp.224-226).
Step 2a. We need to prove that Ck ν 0 > k 0 − ϖ for 0 < k 0 < k * . Define a function ı (k 0 ) ≡ Ck ν 0 − (k 0 − ϖ), then by our chosen values of C and ν we know that ı (k * ) = ı ′ (k * ) = 0. In addition, note that ı ′′ (k 0 ) = Cν (ν − 1) k ν−2 0 > 0 provided ν > 1, thus we obtain ı (k 0 ) > 0 for ∀0 < k 0 < k * , as desired.
Step 2b. Outside the continuation region Π we have H (t 0 , k 0 ) ≡ ζ (t 0 , k 0 ) = e −ρt 0 (k 0 − ϖ), which implies that
which is obviously satisfied by our specification in (29) .
Step 2c. We need to check whether or not τ Π ≡ τ * < ∞ almost surely. By the non-cooperative equilibrium path of capital per capita we have
Then, by the Law of the Iterated Logarithm of Brownian Motion, we get lim t→∞ k (t) = ∞ a.s.
whenever A + integrable on [k * , ∞), in which the uniform topology is naturally induced by the norm, which is induced by the inner product, of the Hilbert space L 2 (Ω, F, P ). Moreover, it is easy to notice that we can just verify that there exists a constant 0 < C ′ < ∞ such that E [ e −2ρτ k 2 (τ ) ] ≤ C ′ for all τ ∈ T and all k (τ ) ≥ k * . By applying (31) and the Wald Identity we can arrive at
, where we, without loss of generality, let t 0 = 0. Then, we conclude that if 2A + 3σ 2 < 2δ + 2n + 6ρ, the desired result is immediate.
Step 2e. To summarize, we obtain the following sufficient conditions ρ > σ 2 , σ < 0 A + mechanism than that under cooperative mechanism. Therefore, the required assertions in parts
(ii) and (iii) of Proposition 5.1 follow. Q.E.D.
